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SPANGLER v. MEMEL: DEFICIENCY

JUDGMENTS AND THE JUNIOR LIENOR
During the Depression a large number of mortgagors were left

homeless because they were unable to meet their mortgage payments.
These defaults were followed by trustee sales of the mortgaged property. Frequently, however, such sales failed to raise funds sufficient
to pay the mortgagor's outstanding liabilities, and when this occurred,
the mortgagee sought to hold the ousted mortgagor personally liable for
the deficiency. The courts' willingness to give deficiency judgments
saddled the debtor with a dual burden-losing his property and assuming a substantial personal liability. Legislative relief was forthcoming,
however, and in 1933 California's antideficiency statutes were enacted.1
Although the enactment of these statutes may have eased the burden for the mortgagor, the burden on the courts was increased. Since
1933, the courts have struggled to define the limits and application of
the antideficiency statutes, and the struggle has been characterized by
confusion. A striking example of the courts' burden is their approach
to section 580b of the Code of Civil Procedure, which forbids the award

of a deficiency judgment on a purchase money mortgage.

Despite

1. CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. §§ 580a, 580b, 580d & 726 (West Supp. 1972). This
note will not attempt to consider the full thrust of California's antideficiency legislaREAL ESTATE SECURED TRANSACTIONS
tion. See generally J. HETLAND, CALtoRN
(Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar 1970) [hereinafter cited as J.H-TLAND]; Riesenfeld, California
Legislation Curbing Deficiency Judgments, 48 CALF. L. REv. 705 (1960); Rintala,
California'sAnti-Deficiency Legislation and Suretyship Law: The Transversion of Protective Statutory Schemes, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 245, 248-63 (1969); Comment, AntiDeficiency Judgment Legislation in California,3 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 192 (1956).
2. Section 580b was added by Cal. Stat. 1933, ch. 642, § 5, at 1673. It was
subsequently amended, so that in 1953, at the time of the decision in Brown v. Jensen, 41 Cal. 2d 193, 259 P.2d 425 (1953), it read in part, "[n1o deficiency judgment
shall lie in any event after any sale of real property for failure of the purchaser to complete his contract of sale, or under a deed of trust, or mortgage, given to secure payment of the balance of the purchase price of real property." It was amended again
in 1963 (Cal. Stat. 1963, ch. 2158, § 1, at 4500) (additions noted in italics). "No deficiency judgment shall lie in any event after any sale of real property for failure of the
purchaser to complete his contract of sale, or under a deed of trust, or mortgage,
given to the vendor to secure payment of the balance of the purchase price of real
property, or under a deed of trust, or mortgage, on a dwelling for not more than four
families given to a lender to secure repayment of a loan which was in fact used to pay
all or part of the purchase price of such dwelling occupied, entirely or in part, by the
purchaser."
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this prohibition, the California Supreme Court held in Spangler v.
Memel 3 that a vendor in the sale of property intended for commercial
development could collect a deficiency judgment even 4though she had
subordinated her interest to that of a construction lender.
This latest interpretation of section 580b breaks new ground in
the courts' struggle to define the limits and applicability of California's
antideficiency legislation, and this note will focus primarily on the
Spangler decision. Its rationale will be considered in light of previous
cases dealing with the question of whether a deficiency judgment
should be awarded. 5 Further, this note will consider two issues only
tangentially discussed by the Spangler court-whether section 580b
protection can be waived, 6 and whether the court would have reached
the same result in a noncommercial situation. 7 It will be concluded
that any waiver of the statutory protections at the time of purchase is
ineffective and that the Spangler interpretation of section 580b is limited
to commercial transactions.
Spangler v. Memel: Facts and Reasoning
In Spangler v. Memel, the California Supreme Court was confronted by a rather complicated, yet common, series of transactions.
The first in this series was a sale from Spangler to Memel-Kossoff Ventures. Spangler owned a parcel of land on which a single family residence was located, but since the property was zoned for commercial
use, the residence had been converted into an office. Such use, however, did not take full advantage of the commercial zoning, which had
increased the property's financial potential. In order to realize this
potential, Spangler listed her property with an agent specializing in the
sale of commercial real estate, who in turn arranged the sale of MemelKossoff Ventures, a partnership formed to develop property for commercial use.
In addition to the usual provisions, the sales agreement included
a specific clause whereby Spangler agreed to subordinate her lien to
that of a construction lender. Although this clause would facilitate
financing for the development of the property, Spangler attempted to
protect her interest in the purchase price; she insisted that the four general partners of Memel-Kossoff Ventures waive the protection of the
3.
4.

7 Cal. 3d 603, 498 P.2d 1055, 102 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1972).
In a subordination agreement, the subordinating party agrees to place his in-

terest in a lower position or class. One court has said, "[t]o subordinate is to lose position-to give up a better for a worse status." Connell v. Zaid, 268 Cal. App.2d 788,
792, 74 Cal. Rptr.
5. See text
6. See text
7. See text

371, 373 (1969).
accompanying notes 13-48 infra.
accompanying notes 49-54 infra.
accompanying notes 55-65 infra.
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antideficiency statutes, giving a guaranty of joint and several liability
in return for her agreement to subordinate."
Having thus acquired Spangler's commercially zoned parcel,
Memel-Kossoff Ventures transferred its interest to another partnership. This second partnership consisted of the Memel-Kossoff general
partners and an architect, who then sought and obtained construction
loans, giving the bank a deed of trust. The bank, however, conditioned
the loan on Spangler's execution of a specific subordination agreement
in addition to the automatic clause contained in the sales contracts.
The bank insisted on such a procedure in order to have first priority
in case of default.
The bank's insistence on this protection was well founded. The
vendees' venture failed, and when they were unable to secure a takeout
loan,9 they defaulted on their payments to the bank. The bank, in turn,
foreclosed, and in addition to the partnership, Spangler was made a defendant in the action. At the subsequent foreclosure sale, the bank
purchased the improved parcel for less than the balance due on the
note. This made Spangler's junior note worthless, and she filed a
cross complaint against the partners of Memel-Kossoff Ventures. 10
In hearing this cross complaint, the trial court was confronted
with two prior and differing constructions of California's antideficiency
statutes. The partners of Memel-Kossoff were relying on the 1953
case of Brown v. Jensen," which had held that section 580b barred
the collection of a deficiency judgment by a sold out junior lienor. The
plaintiff Spangler, on the other hand, argued that Brown had been im8. Generally speaking, protection of the guarantor is not within the ambit of California's antideficiency schemes. Where the alleged, guarantor is in fact the primary
obligor, however, the creditor cannot strip the mortgagor of his antideficiency protection by way of a transaction which gives him the apparent status of a guarantor. See,
e.g., Union Bank v. Brummell, 269 Cal. App.2d 836, 838, 75 Cal. Rptr. 234, 235

(1969); Riddle v. Lushing, 203 Cal. App.2d 831, 834-36, 21 Cal. Rptr. 902, 903-05
(1962). For a complete treatment concerning the guarantor's status see Rintala, California's Anti-Deficiency Legislation and Suretyship Law: The Transversion of Protective Statutory Schemes, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REy. 245, 263-338 (1969).
9. Whereas the term "construction loan" generally applies to the interim financing of a project, a "takeout loan," designed to pay off earlier loans, generally means a
permanent financing arrangement. Ruth v. Lytton Say. & Loan Ass'n, 266 Cal. App.
2d 831, 833, 72 Cal. Rptr. 521, 523 (1968).

Accord, Jones v. Sacramento Sav. & Loan

Ass'n, 248 Cal. App. 2d 522, 527, 56 Cal. Rptr. 741, 744 (1967). In Jones the court
defines a takeout loan as "the permanent secured loan which the ultimate home buyer
floats to finance his purchase of the dwelling and which supersedes or 'takes out' the

interim construction loan secured by the subdivision developer." Id. In Spangler the
ultimate buyer and the developer were one and the same.
10. Since the bank was no longer a party to the suit, "plaintiff" refers to Spangler (the vendor) and "defendant" refers to the vendee-developers.
11. 41 Cal. 2d 193, 259 P.2d 425 (1953).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 24

pliedly overruled by Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino.12 The trial court
avoided these arguments, however, and found that the guaranty exacted in the sale agreement created a separate obligation binding on
the partners. Because of the plaintiff's reliance on this guaranty, the
defendant partners were estopped from raising the antideficiency statutes in defense. Accordingly, judgment was entered for the plaintiff.
The supreme court did not avoid the seemingly conflicting case
authority in this fashion, preferring to forge a middle ground. In a
unanimous opinion authored by Justice Sullivan, the court expressly
affirmed Brown, but, in doing so, held that Brown was not applicable
to the facts in light of the Roseleaf decision. This approach to Spangler's forebears has broken new ground-allowing a deficiency judgment where it was previously thought barred. Furthermore, despite
the court's protestations to the contrary, Brown has been limited.
Spangler's Forebears
Even though limited by Spangler, Brown v. Jensen13 remains the
leading California case in construing the antideficiency statutes. In
that case, section 580b was held to bar collection of deficiency judgments by vendors who subordinated their purchase money encumbrances to those of third party lenders. Thus, under Brown, these
vendors were left without remedy when their security interest was exhausted by a senior lienor's foreclosure. Such a result was greeted with
little enthusiasm by commentators, 1" and, ten years later, these commentators were partially vindicated when Brown seemingly was overruled by the supreme court's decision in Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino.1 5 In that case, the court analyzed the purposes for section 580b
lineated in Brown and found them all unpersuasive."
Brown, how12. 59 Cal. 2d 35, 378 P.2d 97, 27 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1963).
13. 41 Cal. 2d 193, 259 P.2d 425 (1953).
14. See, e.g., 6 HASTINGS L.J. 248 (1955), where the author argued that Brown
v. Jensen should have followed the dicta set out in Hillen v. Soule, 7 Cal. App. 2d 45, 45
P.2d 349 (1935); namely, to allow a suit on the note where the security is exhausted
by sale under the first deed of trust and no sale is had under the second deed of trust.
This he contends is not a deficiency judgment. "A deficiency judgment in California,
and by the weight of authority in other jurisdictions, demands a prior sale under the
power of sale of a deed of trust or a foreclosure under the mortgage by the creditor
seeking the deficiency judgment. There was no such sale or foreclosure in this case.
True, there was a foreclosure under the first mortgage, but how should that affect the
second, other than to diminish the security. It is stretching Section 580b almost to the
breaking point, and perhaps beyond, to say that foreclosure of the first mortgage affects
the second so as to limit, and, in this case, destroy the creditor's rights." Thus, it
was especially irksome that the junior had in no way caused the loss of the security.
Id. at 252.
15. 59 Cal. 2d 35, 378 P.2d 97, 27 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1963). See note 16, infra.
16. The first rationale expressed in Brown was that anyone taking such a deed of
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ever, was not expressly overruled, and the Roseleaf decision was distinguishable because it involved junior purchase money trust deeds on
property which was not part of the plaintiff-defendant sale. Because
of these factors, Roseleafs exact status as a construction of the antide-

ficiency statutes was questionable.

At least one scholar saw it as "the

analytical-though not actual--overruling of Brown v. Jensen
.
. ,17 The courts of appeal, however, refused to go that far' 8 and
followed Brown albeit unenthusiastically:
We recognize the manifest inequity of disallowing the typical junior purchase money lender from recovering a personal judgment
against the borrower after a senior lienholder has exhausted the
security under the senior lien. . . . However, as stated in Younker v. Reseda Manor. . . "But the Supreme Court has not overruled Brown v. Jensen. It stands as the expression of law on this
subject." Under the compulsion of Brown v. Jensen . . . we
must reverse the judgment. 19
Much doubt about the status of Brown was removed in 1969 when it
was cited with approval by the supreme court.2 0 Nevertheless, Mrs.
Spangler contended that Brown had been overruled.
The supreme court rejected this contention,"' but refused to apply
trust knows the value of his security and assumes the risk that it will become exhausted.
The Roseleaf court said that although the average vendor might be more astute in judging the value of the security, that would be a "doubtful . . .reason for barring deficiency judgments in purchase-money security transactions." 59 Cal. 2d at 42, 378 P.2d
at 101, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 877. With respect to the second purpose advanced in Brown
(that only the security can be looked to for recovery), the Roseleaf court found that it
was not a purpose at all, but a mere conclusion which states the effect of section 580b
and offers no assistance in deciding whether it applies. Id. The dissent in Brown
suggested that the purpose was to prevent creditors from buying the property for a nominal sum and then holding the debtor for the deficiency; the Roseleaf court, however,
pointed out that this purpose was accomplished by the fair value provisions contained
in the Code of Civil Procedure sections 580a and 726. 59 Cal. 2d at 43, 378 P.2d at 101,
26 Cal. Rptr. at 877.
17. Hetland, Real Property and Real Property Security: The Well-Being of the
Law, 53 CALIF. L. Rlv. 151, 159 (1965). Professor Hetland based his remark on the
fact that the Roseleaf decision had undermined the reasoning behind Brown. See note
16 supra. It should perhaps be noted that Professor Hetland, an ardent foe of the
Brown v. Jensen decision, was amicus curiae for Roseleaf.
18. See, e.g., Jackson v. Taylor, 272 Cal. App. 2d 1, 76 Cal. Rptr. 891 (1969);

Younker v. Reseda Manor, 255 Cal. App. 2d 431, 63 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1967).
19. Jackson v. Taylor, 272 Cal. App. 2d 1, 7, 76 Cal. Rptr. 891, 895 (1969).
20. Kistler v. Vasi, 71 Cal. 2d 261, 262, 455 P.2d 106, 107, 78 Cal. Rptr. 170,
171 (1969). In speaking of the decision of a previous case, Bargioni v. Hill, 59 Cal.
2d 121, 378 P.2d 593, 28 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1963), the court said, "Accordingly, we
concluded that section 580b as it then read precluded a deficiency judgment in favor of
the broker after the security had been exhausted by a sale under the first deed of trust.
(See also Brown v. Jensen. ....
)"
21. "W~e reject [plaintiff's] dilution of Brown v. Jensen and reaffirm its continued vitality. We hold, however, that the application of Roseleaf to the facts of this

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 24

Brown to the Spangler facts. Rather, the court relied on the test enunciated in Roseleaf.2 This test makes two inquiries: (1) whether the
transaction is a "standard purchase money mortgage" which requires
the automatic application of section 580b, and (2) if it is a variation
on the standard transaction, whether the application of the section is
necessary to prevent overvaluation of the property or to stabilize land
sales.2 3 The first of these inquiries is a recognition of Brown's bar to
deficiency judgments and is, therefore, the first barrier to a vendor's
recovery. The second inquiry is Roseleaf's modification of Brown.
Thus, in order to avoid Brown, the Spangler court found that it was
not dealing with a standard purchase money mortgage.
The Standard Purchase Money Mortgage
Finding that it was not dealing with a standard purchase money
mortgage, the court stated that in such a mortgage "the vendor of real
property retains an interest in the land sold to secure payment of the
purchase price."24 This interest is retained because the vendee cannot
meet the vendor's price by giving him a down payment and then obtaining a third party loan for the balance. This loan normally is secured by a first deed of trust given to the lender. However, because the
amount of the loan, if granted, would exceed the security value of the
property, the vendee cannot finance in this conventional fashion. Thus,
if he still wishes to purchase the property at the vendor's price, an alternate method of financing must be found. This is ordinarily done
by obtaining a third party loan secured by a first deed of trust to the
lender, and then giving the vendor a note for the difference between
the purchase price (less any down payment) and the amount of the
loan. This vendor-vendee note is secured by a second deed of trust.
A simple example best illustrates this technique. A wishes to purchase land from B, for which B is asking $20,000. A gives B a down
payment of $5,000 and seeks to obtain a loan for $15,000 to cover the
remainder of the purchase price. Based on its appraisal of the property, however, the lending institution will only advance A a $10,000
case compels the conclusion that section 580b is here inapplicable." 7 Cal. 3d at 609,
498 P.2d at 1058, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 810. As if to take a jab at those who predicted

the death of Brown the court said, "We have never overruled or modified this central
ruling that section 580b applies to a sold-out junior lienor holding such security for
the payment of the balance of the purchase price." Id. at 609-10, 498 P.2d at 1059,
102 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
22. 7 Cal. 3d at 611-12, 498 P.2d at 1059-60, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 811-12.
23. 59 Cal. 2d at 42, 378 P.2d at 101, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 877. See text accompanying notes 24-48 infra.
24. Spangler v. Memel, 7 Cal. 3d 603, 610, 498 P.2d 1055, 1059, 102 Cal. Rptr.
807, 811 (1972) citing Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 59 Cal. 2d 35, 41, 378 P.2d 97,

100, 27 Cal. Rptr. 873, 876 (1963).
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loan, taking the first deed of trust on the property as security. Thus,
if B wishes to complete the sale with A, he must agree to take A's note
for $5,000 secured by a second deed of trust on the property. Such
a fact situation existed in Brown.
In Spangler the court faced facts somewhat similar to this standard
purchase money mortgage situation. Mrs. Spangler had accepted a
down payment and a deed of trust, which she knew would be subordinated, 25 as consideration for the sale, and, as in Brown, a third party
lender was present. The court, however, did not find these similarities
to the standard purchase money mortgage sufficient to invoke Brown's
automatic application of section 580b to bar the deficiency judgment.
The third party loan was a construction loan, and this was the crucial
factor in the court's surmounting the Brown barrier in order to proceed
to the second Roseleaf inquiry.
When a construction loan is sought and received, the vendee borrows for the purpose of improving or changing the present use of the
land. On the other hand, in the standard purchase money mortage case,
the vendee, contemplating the same use of the land, borrows to raise
additional purchase money. On the basis of this distinction, the Spangler court held that where subordination is incident to contemplated
construction, the transaction is a variation of the standard transaction,
thus making the second Roseleaf inquiry applicable and entirely removing Brown's bar.
The Lower Courts and Construction Loans
Even though the supreme court found that subordination as an incident to contemplated construction constituted a variation of the standard purchase money mortgage, several California courts of appeal have
failed to make such a distinction. In doing so, these courts reached
results opposite from that in Spangler. For example, Raub v. Lee, 26 a
case decided prior to Roseleaf, involved essentially the same facts as
Spangler. Raub sold a parcel of land to the defendants and received
25.

Most lending institutions cannot or will not take a junior security interest.
supra note 1, § 5.4 at 206. The seller's lien has statutory priority (Cal.
Civ. Code § 2898 (West 1954)) so he must agree to subordinate if the buyer is to be
able to get a loan secured by the purchased property. Although outside the scope of
this note, for a discussion of the role of savings and loans in land financing, see generally Lefcoe & Dobson, Savings Associations as Land Developers, 75 YALE L.J. 1271
(1966).
26. 181 Cal. App. 2d 529, 5 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1960). This case was disapproved
by the court in Spangler to the extent that it was inconsistent with that opinion. However, the court did note that since there was no purchase for commercial development,
but rather for the purpose of building a single family residence, the facts remove
Raub from the holding in Spangler, 7 Cal. 3d at 614-15 n.9, 498 P.2d at 1062 n.9, 102
Cal. Rptr. at 814 n.9. See text accompanying notes 63-4 infra.
J. I-ELnA',
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both a down payment and a note secured by the first deed of trust
on the property. Raub then allowed the note to be subordinated to
facilitate granting of a construction loan. When the defendants defaulted on this subsequent note, the construction lender foreclosed; the
property was sold, and Raub's security was exhausted. He sued, and,
in holding recovery barred by section 580b, the court stated, "[cilearly
trust deeds and clearly they
their deeds of trust were purchase money
27
are within the rule of the Brown case.
This application of the Brown rule to subordination in contemplation of construction continued after the supreme court's decision in
Roseleaf. Two cases 28 similar to Raub were considered by the courts
of appeal. Both involved sold out junior lienors who had subordinated their interests to those of third party lenders. There was, however, one twist. In both cases, guaranties of the subordinated note
were involved, and the vendees had transferred the purchased land to
corporations which the courts found were nothing more than mere instrumentalities through which the vendees operated. 29 Yet, in both
Valinda Builders, Inc. v. Bissner,3 0 and Kincaid v. Gomez,3 the courts
found that the defendants had not lost their status as principal obligors.
These findings were the basis for holding that section 580b protection
was not abrogated, and the Brown bar was applied to deny the vendorplaintiff relief. For example, in Kincaid, after concluding that the
defendants were principal obligors, the court assumed that the facts
brought them squarely within the standard purchase money mortgage
situation: "The essence of the transaction is that of a purchase money
note secured by a deed of trust."'3 2 In failing to make the distinction
which the Spangler court made, these courts fell into line with commentators who treated the purchase money deed of trust in a subordination situation as falling within the boundaries of those judgments
barred by Brown.33
27. 181 Cal. App. 2d at 531, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 445 (1960).
28. Kincaid v. Gomez, 274 Cal. App. 2d 839, 79 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1969); Valinda
Builders, Inc. v. Bissner, 230 Cal. App. 2d 106, 40 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1964).
29. See note 8 supra.
30. 230 Cal. App. 2d at 111, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 738.
31. 274 Cal. App. 2d at 842, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 540.
32. Id. at 842, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
33. "Perhaps the greatest inequity in Brown v. Jensen lies in its application to the
junior who became so by subordinating his purchase money lien to the buyer's construction loan. Often the subordinated seller will be a nonprofessional in the real
property business, a rancher or a farmer, for example, and the buyer will be a real estate promoter or developer. Since the construction loan typically is several times
larger than the seller's land loan, the subordinated seller rarely has any hope of reinstating the construction loan in the event of the developer's default. If doing so is a prerequisite to his protection, as it is under Brown v. Jensen, he is without remedy. There

is nothing in section 580b that expressly precludes the junior from recovering a
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Spangler and the Second Roseleaf Inquiry

Despite these previous decisions by the lower courts and the commentators' pronouncements on the scope of the Brown rule, the Spangler court removed the commercial construction subordination situation
from the standard transactions requiring automatic application of section 580b. This removal in turn resulted in examination of the facts
under the second Roseleaf inquiry. That is, since the transaction was
not a standard purchase money mortgage, the court considered whether
section 580b protection was necessary to prevent overvaluation or to
stabilize land sales. These considerations were denominated in Roseleaf as the purposes for the section's bar to deficiency judgments.3 4
The Spangler court reviewed these two purposes and the facts, coming
to the conclusion that the defendant developers were beyond the pro-

tection of section 580b.
The first purpose announced in Roseleaf was preventing overvaluation of property. By placing the risk of inadequate security on
the purchase money mortgagee and not allowing the collection of a
deficiency judgment, the vendor is discouraged from overvaluing the

property.3 5

This in turn discourages precarious land promotion

judgment against the developer for the amount owing after the construction lender
takes the security; only Brown v. Jensen's strained construction of 580b prevents it.
"Brown-v. Jensen allows the developer to treat the subordinated seller's note more or
less as an option he can walk away from at any time without fear of liability." Hetland, Real Property and Real Property Security: The Well-Being of the Law, 53
CAuiu. L. Rv. 151, 161 (1965).
34. See note 16 supra. In announcing these two purposes, the Roseleaf court rejected the rationale for section 580b set forth in Brown.
35. Compare Rintala, California's Anti-Deficiency Legislation and Suretyship
Law: The Transversion of Protective Statutory Schemes, 17 U.C.L.A. L. Rv.245, 26162 (1969), with Hetland, Deficiency Judgment Limitations in California-A New
Judicial Approach, 51 CALiF. L. RFv. 1, 2-7 (1963) for conflicting analyses as to just
what is meant by the concept of overvaluation. Professor Rintala argues that the focus
must be on the concept of overvaluation from the vendee's perspective of the risk he has
bargained for. If the vendor accepts as his sole security the second deed of trust without demanding additional collateral, the vendee may be deemed to have relied on the
purchase price as representing the "market value" or "security" value of the property. Thus, permitting the vendor to recover would place the risk of overvaluation on the vendee who presumably bargained for property worth at least the amount
of the purchase price secured by the senior and junior liens together. Professor Hetland, on the other hand, argues that the effect of 580b is not to lower property prices
or prevent overvaluation because he says developers would have little to lose by paying more on paper for the land because he can walk away should the project turn out
unprofitably. So he argues that overvaluation means instead "credit depressant"-i.e.,
discouraging third party lenders from extending credit on overvalued property. But
cf., Lefcoe & Schaffer, Construction Lending and the Equitable Lien, 40 S.CAL.L. REv.
439, 454 n.47 (1967) for a differing viewpoint. "The grand exploration of how a
series of cases concerning antideficiency laws or equitable liens is going to effect wealth
distribution, loss spreading, real estate overappraisal, or fraud prevention is quixotic."
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schemes because the property's security value gives purchasers a clue
as to its true market value.3 6 The Spangler court found this rationale
to be a critical factor in distinguishing Mrs. Spangler from the junior
lienor in Brown. Mrs. Spangler's present security value had no bearing
on the purchase price; instead, the purchase price reflected the property's anticipated value after improvements were made.3 7 Naturally,
when no change in land use is contemplated, the present security value
gives an accurate indication of the purchase price.
In addition to this distinction based on the relation between purchase price and security value, the court found that the construction
subordination situation is substantially different from the standard purchase money mortgage situation. This difference is founded on considerations of who should bear the risks of overvaluation. In the
standard case, i.e., where the vendee must give the vendor a note for
the difference between the amount of the primary loan and the purchase
price, prevention of overvaluation is best achieved by barring the vendor
from collecting a deficiency judgment. 38 The vendor in this situation
has notice that his land may be overvalued whenever the vendee, using
the land as security, is unable to obtain a third party loan for the
balance of the purchase price. If the vendor insists on completing the
transaction after such warning, he runs the risk of being barred by
section 580b should the purchaser default.3 9
In the construction situation the reverse is true; preventing overvaluation is best achieved by placing the threat of a deficiency judgment on the vendee 4 0 In such a situation, the present security value
has no bearing on the purchase price, and no clue is available to the
vendor to determine whether the land is overvalued.
Furthermore, in the usual sale for commercial development, the
seller can charge more for the property than if the same use is contemplated. This is because the developer sees the potential for profits
as soon as his construction scheme reaches fruition, and he therefore
is willing to pay more for the land.41 If the seller is to get his expected price for the property in such situations, he must agree to subordinate his lien;4 2 the developer generally cannot pay cash for the
land and simultaneously finance construction.
36. Spangler v. Memel, 7 Cal. 3d 603, 612, 498 P.2d 1055, 1060, 102 Cal. Rptr.
807, 812 (1972), citing Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 59 Cal. 2d 35, 42, 378 P.2d
97, 101, 27 Cal. Rptr. 873, 877 (1963).
37. Spangler v. Memel, 7 Cal. 3d 603, 611-13, 498 P.2d 1055, 1059-61, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 807, 811-13 (1972).
38. Id. at 613, 498 P.2d at 1061, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 813.
39. Id. at 612, 498 P.2d at 1061, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 813. See note 35 supra.
40. Spangler v. Memel, 7 Cal. 3d 603, 613, 498 P.2d 1055, 1061, 102 Cal. Rptr.
807, 813 (1972). But see note 35 supra.
41. J. HETLAND, supra note 1, § 5.4, at 205-06.
42. See note 25 supra.
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In subordinating his lien, the seller, in effect, becomes a de facto
partner in the construction scheme because he has financed it in the
form of a second deed of trust on the property.4 s Although he has
no authority to direct the project, payment on his note depends on the
project's successful completion." If section 580b were used as a bar,
"the developer [could] treat the subordinated seller's note more or less
as an option he can walk away from. . . ."5 Should that occur the
risk of failure would be placed squarely on the shoulders of the seller.
Obviously this would not have the effect of preventing overvalu-

ation, nor would it deter precarious land development schemes.

The

developer might be willing to undertake inordinately risky schemes if
only his down payment were at stake, but the very real threat of personal liability would force the developer into a realistic appraisal of
the opportunity for success, and provide some motivation thereafter.
Thus, developers 46would be less likely to pay more than the land is

reasonably worth.
As a result, removal of the vendee's section 580b protection in
the construction subordination setting should have a preventive effect,
as well as the more direct effect of allowing the vendor to recover.
The additional threat of personal liability should force developers to
more thoughtfully consider their projects and to shore up or drop the

marginal ones.
The second purpose for section 580b enunciated in Roseleaf is
43. See Miller v. Citizen's Say. & Loan Ass'n, 248 Cal. App. 2d 655, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 844 (1967). "Subordination arrangements are in the nature of a mutual enterprise, wherein the vendor provides the land, the purchaser the 'know how' and the
purchaser's lending agency the capital, for the mutually beneficial purpose of developing the land ....
." Id. at 662-63, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 850.
44. In Handy v. Gordon, 65 Cal. 2d 578, 422 P.2d 329, 55 Cal. Rptr. 769
(1967), the court delineated the minimum terms necessary to constitute an enforceable subordination agreement. This was to protect the vendor from loss of his land.
See also, Note, Purchase Money Subordination Agreements in California: An Analysis
of ConditionalSubordination,45 S.CAL. L. Rnv. 1109 (1972).
45. Hetland, Real Property and Real Property Security: The Well-Being of the
Law, 53 CALiF. L. REv. 151, 161 (1965).
46. J. HELAND, supra note 1, § 6.32, at 286-87. The Spangler court touches another difference between the two situations that should be a real consideration in the
mind of a seller who subordinates. Section 2924c of the Civil Code provides that the
junior lienor may protect his interest by reinstating the senior mortgage, i.e., he may
cure the mortgagors default by paying the mortgagor the amount that the mortgagee
is in default. In a construction subordination situation, however, the amount of the
loan is generally very large, a fact which precludes the typical vendor from protecting his interest. For example, in Spangler, the vendor agreed to subordinate to loans
in the amount up to $2,000,000 and in fact, loans totaling $408,000 were actually
obtained. Thus, the court reasoned, allowing a deficiency judgment would be the only
available protection for the vendor. 7 Cal. 3d at 614, 498 P.2d at 1061-62, 102 Cal.
Rptr. at 813-14.
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the stabilization of land sales, a goal traceable to the very inception of
the antideficiency statutes. That is, if inadequate security results from
some outside cause-such as a decline in land values during a depression-"section 580b prevents the aggravation of the downturn that
would result if defaulting purchasers were burdened with large personal liability.14 7 The Spangler court easily disposed of this purpose
by finding that it "has little application to a sold-out junior lienor in
the subordination clause context."4 Thus, the court held that the defendant partners were beyond the protection of section 580b.
Implication and Extension
In finding that a sold out junior lienor in the construction subordination context can enforce a deficiency judgment, the supreme court
left two questions unanswered. These are: whether section 580b protection can be waived and whether the Spangler result will be extended
in the noncommercial context. Even though these issues were not
reached, previous decisions and Spangler itself lead to the conclusion
that both questions will be answered in the negative.
Spangler and Contractual Waiver
Because of the danger that the vendees might default and leave
her without remedy, Mrs. Spangler required as a condition of sale that
the defendants individually waive their protection under the antideficiency statutes. Since the court decided that section 580b was not a
bar to plaintiff's recovery, it was not compelled to determine whether
waiver at the time of purchase would be effective where section 580b
would otherwise apply. The present state of the law, however, indicates that section 580b protection is not subject to such waiver.
Section 2953 of the California Civil Code 49 vitiates any express
waiver of, inter alia, sections 580a or 726 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but fails to mention section 580b. The courts have not, however,
interpreted this omission to mean that section 580b protection is freely
waivable. On the contrary, dicta indicates that this protection may
not be subject to waiver. In Freedland v. GreC 5° the supreme court
47. Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 59 Cal. 2d 35, 42, 378 P.2d 97, 101, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 873, 877 (1963).
48. 7 Cal. 3d at 614, 498 P.2d at 1062, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
49. "Any express agreement made or entered into by a borrower at the time of
or in connection with the making of or renewing of any loan secured by a deed of trust,
mortgage or other instrument creating a lien on real property, whereby the borrower
agrees to waive the rights, or privileges conferred upon him by Sections 2924, 2924b,
2924c of the Civil Code or by Sections 580a or 726 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
shall be void and of no effect ......
CAL. CMv. CODE § 2953 (West 1954).
50. 45 Cal. 2d 462, 289 P.2d 463 (1955).
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noted that Brown recognized the legislative intent to strictly limit the
right to recover deficiency judgments. The court then added, "[m]ore
over, those provisions [580a, 580b, 580d, 726] may not be waived in
advance by the debtor. . . ."I' Although the court cited several cases
to support this proposition,52 no case cited expressly ruled on section
580b. In more recent decisions, Freedlandhas been cited for the proposition that the protection of section 580b may not be waived.5 3
Even though Freedlandmay not constitute strong authority, there
is a strong argument in favor of its alleged result. Should section
580b be deemed freely waivable at the time of sale, it is hard to imagine
any vendor who would be willing to enter into a land transaction without
requiring such a waiver. Such a rule would, in effect, render section
580b worthless as protective legislation. In an analogous situation
prior to the adoption of Civil Code section 2953, the supreme court
said, referring to Code of Civil Procedure section 726: "[s]ince necessity
often drives debtors to make ruinous concessions when a loan is needed,
section 726 should be applied to protect them and prevent a waiver in
advance."5 4
Spangler, at least by implication, continues to support the impression that the protection of section 580b cannot be waived. By expressly
affirming Brown, but not applying it to the instant facts, the court employed a method which enabled them to protect a Spangler-type vendor
without allowing a waiver which would open the door to a wholesale
abrogation of the statute's protective effect.
Spangler and the Noncommercial Transaction
A second question left unanswered by Spangler is whether the
same result would be reached if the transaction was not commercial, but
was residential within the meaning of the 1963 amendment to section
580b. r5 The Spangler court carefully restricted its holding to those
56
situations in which the property was sold for commercial development.
Arguably, an opposite result could be reached in the noncommercial
51. Id. at 467, 289 P.2d at 465.
52. Morello v. Metzenbaum, 25 Cal. 2d 494, 154 P.2d 670 (1944) (general discussion); Salter v. Ulrich, 22 Cal. 2d 263, 138 P.2d 7 (1943) (general discussion); California Bank v. Stimson, 89 Cal. App. 2d 552, 201 P.2d 39 (1949) (section 580a);
Winklemen v. Sides, 31 Cal. App. 2d 387, 88 P.2d 147 (1939) (section 726).
53. E.g., Roberts v. Graves, 269 Cal. App. 2d 410, 415, 75 Cal. Rptr. 130, 133
(1969); Valinda Builders, Inc. v. Bissner, 230 Cal. App. 2d 106, 112, 40 Cal. Rptr. 735,
739 (1964).
54. Salter v. Ulrich, 22 Cal. 2d 263, 267, 138 P.2d 7, 9 (1943). Section 726
provides certain guidelines for the enforcement of any right secured by a mortgage, the
net effect of which is to provide protection for the debtor.
55. See note 2 supra.
56. 7 Cal. 3d at 614, 498 P.2d at 1062, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
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case, and the reasons are several: the implications of the 1963 amendment and the judicial attitude gleaned from its interpretation, the
Spangler court's failure to completely overrule Raub v. Lee, and the
differing sources of income which pay off the loan in the two situations.
Two cases, one decided before the 1963 amendment and one decided after, provide the best frame of reference in order to consider
the implications of the amendment. The first of these cases is Bargioni
v. Hill.5 7 In that case, the supreme court held that money lent by
someone other than the seller was to be considered purchase money
for the purposes of section 580b. At the time of this holding, the
statute provided that no deficiency judgment would lie after any sale of
real property "under a deed of trust, or mortgage, given to secure payment of the balance of the purchase price of real property."' S Applying the statute literally, the court ruled that since the purchase
money note was secured by a deed of trust the lender was barred from
recovering a deficiency judgment.
Subsequent to Bargioni, and as a result thereof, section 580b was
amended. 9 This amendment allowed third party lenders to collect
deficiency judgments in certain situations, but the legislature did not
totally eliminate all protection against such lenders. This established a
special class of vendees which included purchasers who used the loan
to pay all or part of the purchase price on dwellings for not more
than four families, if in fact they occupied all or part of the premises.
On the other hand, nonresidential purchasers were not to be protected
in similar suits brought by nonvendor lenders.
In 1969, this amendment was interpreted in Kistler v. Vasi. ° The
facts in that case were parallel to those in Bargioni. Because of the
1963 amendment, however, the opposite result was reached. The
Kistler property was unimproved commercial land, and thus fell outside the protection offered by the amendment to residential purchasers;
accordingly, a deficiency judgment was allowed.
Bargioni,Kistler and the 1963 amendment do not bear directly on
the development situation because they were concerned not with a vendor's recovery against a developer-purchaser, but with the scope of a
nonvendor's recovery. They are, however, pertinent to the problem
of recovery against a noncommercial vendee. That is, they recognize
legislative priorities which protect different classes of purchasers.6'
57.

59 Cal. 2d 121, 378 P.2d 593, 28 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1963).

58.

Cal. Stat. 1949, ch. 1599, § 1, at 2846.

59. Cal. Stat. 1963, ch. 2158, § 1, at 4500.
60. 71 Cal. 2d 261, 455 P.2d 106, 78 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1969).
61. See Hetland, Real Property and Real Property Security: The Well-Being of
the Law, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 151, 163-64 (1965). Professor Hetland's contention is that
the amendment, although it withdraws protection from the commercial vendee (thus
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This recognition, by analogy, imparts a clue as to the application of
Spangler in a residential situation. The court, in fact, expressly raised
the possibilities:
In Kistler v. Vasi... this court recognized that the Legislature by
[the 1963] amendment singled out commercial development purchasers for different treatment with respect to nonvendor purchase
money lenders. It is consistent with the spirit of that amendment
to treat the commercial development of property
differently in de62
termining the applicability of section 580b.
The court did not, however, specifically state its intentions regarding the treatment of residential purchasers, even though it discussed a
case directly on point. In Raub v. Lee, 63 the vendor subordinated at
the vendee's insistence. This subordination was necessary to allow the
financing of construction of a single family residence for the vendee's
use. Since Raub was decided prior to Roseleaf and the 1963 amendment, the district court of appeal did not discuss the distinctions between the commercial and noncommercial situations; it merely invoked
Brown to bar the vendors from a deficiency judgment. Rather than
completely overrule Raub, the Spangler court disapproved it to the extent that it was inconsistent with Spangler, but ultimately distinguished
the two because Raub did not involve a commercial fact situation 4
-thus leaving open the door for a different result when this situation
arises.
In addition to the 1963 amendment and Spangler's treatment of
Raub, there is another reason for limiting Spangler to commercial transactions. This reason is the source of the funds used to repay the loans.
In the commercial situation, the vendee is in the business of buying property for development. This vendee-developer, as an expert, has
planned his project so that its rents and profits will be the source of
income. This income is used to pay off both the construction loan and
the trust deed held by the vendor. Therefore, the ultimate success of
the project is the determinative factor when considering repayment of
the loans. For this reason, the threat of personal liability should be
placed on the commercial developer. 65 Placing such a burden on the
commercial developer forces him to carefully plan his projects in order
to pay off the loans.
Although the commercial developer should bear the risk of personal liability under a deficiency judgment, the noncommercial vendee
should not bear such a risk because he is not an expert in the same sense
in effect overruling the decision in Bargioni), nevertheless is consistent with Bargioni
because it carried forward protection of the residential purchaser.
62. 7 Cal. 3d at 614 n.8, 498 P.2d at 1062 n.8, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 814 n.8.
63. 181 Cal. App. 2d 529, 5 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1960).
64. 7 Cal. 3d at 614-15 n.9, 498 P.2d at 1062 n.9, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 814 n.9.
65. Id. at 613, 498 P.2d at 1061, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 813.
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as the commercial developer; the residential vendee merely purchases
the property for his own use. Furthermore, in the typical case-unlike
the typical commercial case-the property is not income producing.
Therefore, rents and profits are not considered as part of the home
owner's ability to repay the construction loan. Instead, the vendee's
ability to meet his obligations under the construction loan and the vendor's deed of trust is a function of his outside income, income extrinsic
to the obligations themselves. For these reasons, the risks of loss
should rest on the subordinated junior lienor in the noncommercial
transaction.
Even though Spangler did not answer the question of whether a
noncommercial vendee will be held personally liable upon default, there
are substantial reasons to conclude that the decision will be limited to
commercial vendees. These reasons stem from the legislature's recognition that the noncommercial vendee is entitled to special protection.
Furthermore, in allocating the risk of a deficiency judgment, the yendee's expertise and sources of income should be considered. Such considerations lead to the conclusion that the courts will follow the spirit
of section 580b, as amended in 1963, and refuse to extend Spangler to
the noncommercial transaction.
Conclusion
Spangler v. Memel is the supreme court's latest interpretation of
California's antideficiency legislation. In allowing a subordinated junior
lienor to recover, the court has broken new ground. It has, furthermore, clarified inconsistencies which previously had existed as a result of its decision in Brown v. Jensen and its subsequent decision in
Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino. Under Spangler, Brown is limited to
standard purchase money mortgages, while the Roseleaf tests are applied to transactions other than standard purchase money mortgages.
Though these cases were placed in proper perspective, the supreme court
left open the questions of the effect of a waiver of section 580b protection and Spangler's applicability to noncommercial transactions. A
review of prior California decisions, however, and the legislative history of section 580b, leads to the conclusion that the section's protection
cannot be waived, and that Spangler will not be extended beyond the
commercial transaction.
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